How Russia is losing one of its allies to one of its worst enemies

Russia has long enjoyed a close relationship with Belarus, a former Soviet republic that shares its border, culture and language. Belarus has been a loyal ally of Moscow, supporting its policies in the region and hosting its military bases. Belarus has also been a buffer state between Russia and NATO, preventing the Western alliance from expanding eastward.

However, this relationship is now under threat. Belarus is facing a political crisis, triggered by the disputed presidential election in August 2020 that saw the incumbent Alexander Lukashenko claim a landslide victory amid allegations of fraud and repression.

Since then, hundreds of thousands of Belarusians have taken to the streets to demand a new vote and the release of political prisoners. The protests have been met with brutal force by the security forces, resulting in dozens of deaths and thousands of arrests.

The European Union and the United States have condemned Lukashenko’s crackdown and imposed sanctions on his regime. They have also expressed support for the opposition leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, who claims to have won the election and is now in exile in Lithuania. The EU and the US have called for a peaceful transition of power and a dialogue between the government and the opposition.

This has angered Russia, which sees Belarus as part of its sphere of influence and a vital strategic asset. Russia has accused the West of interfering in Belarus’ internal affairs and trying to orchestrate a “color revolution” to topple Lukashenko and install a pro-Western government. Russia has warned that it will not tolerate any external pressure on Belarus and that it will defend its interests by all means necessary.

Russia has also offered support to Lukashenko, who has visited Moscow several times since the election to seek assistance from his counterpart Vladimir Putin. Russia has pledged to provide financial aid, security guarantees and diplomatic backing to Belarus. Russia has also announced that it will hold joint military exercises with Belarus in September 2023, which some analysts see as a show of force and a warning to the West.

However, despite Russia’s efforts, Lukashenko’s position is becoming increasingly untenable. His legitimacy is eroding both at home and abroad, as more people join the protests, and more countries refuse to recognize him as the president. His repression has alienated many Belarusians who used to support him or remain indifferent to politics. His dependence on Russia has also undermined his image as a defender of Belarus’ sovereignty and independence.

Moreover, Lukashenko’s survival may not be in Russia’s best interest either. Lukashenko has proven to be an unreliable and unpredictable partner for Moscow, often playing off Russia against the West to extract concessions from both sides. He has resisted Russia’s attempts to deepen the integration between the two countries, fearing that it would diminish his power and autonomy. He has also opposed some of Russia’s foreign policy initiatives, such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the intervention in Syria in 2015.

Therefore, Russia may be looking for an alternative to Lukashenko, one that can stabilize Belarus, maintain its loyalty to Moscow and improve its relations with the West. Such an alternative could be found among the moderate factions of the opposition, who are not necessarily anti-Russian but rather pro-democratic and pro-reform. Some of these factions have expressed their willingness to engage with Russia and respect its interests, as long as they are based on mutual respect and cooperation.

However, finding such an alternative is not easy. The opposition is fragmented and diverse, with different agendas and visions for the future of Belarus. The most prominent figure, Tikhanovskaya, has little political experience and no clear program. She has also rejected any dialogue with Lukashenko or his representatives, insisting on his resignation as a precondition for any negotiations. Moreover, some elements of the opposition are more radical and nationalist, who may seek to distance Belarus from Russia and align it with the West.

The challenge for Russia is to identify and support a viable candidate who can bridge the gap between the government and the opposition, between Russia and the West, and between the old and the new Belarus. Such a candidate would need to have credibility among the protesters, legitimacy among the international community and trust among the Kremlin. Such a candidate would also need to have a clear vision for Belarus’ future, one that respects its sovereignty, democracy and diversity.

If Russia fails to find such a candidate, it risks losing one of its allies to one of its worst enemies: chaos. A prolonged political crisis in Belarus could destabilize the country and the region, creating opportunities for violence, extremism and foreign intervention. A collapse of Belarus could also endanger Russia’s security and interests, exposing it to new threats and challenges on its western flank.

Russia cannot afford to let this happen. It needs to act fast and smart to prevent a worst-case scenario in Belarus. It needs to recognize that Lukashenko is part of the problem, not the solution, and that his departure is inevitable and desirable. It needs to engage with the opposition and the civil society and support a peaceful and democratic transition of power.

It needs to balance its interests with its values and show that it can be a constructive and responsible actor in the region. Russia has a choice to make in Belarus: to be part of the solution or part of the problem. The choice it makes will have profound implications for its own future and for the future of Europe.